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F.2d at 1364. Thereafter, 38 C.F.R. 
§ 36.4324(f) provides that the VA has 15 
days in which to give the lender instruc-
tions regarding such proceedings. Id. 
While the VA attempts to overcome its 
failure to comply with Section 45-1512 pur-
suant to the six-year statute of limitation 
provided under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(d), the 
analysis in Whitehead simply does not sup-
port such a conclusion. Indeed, nothing in 
the record suggests that the VA was un-
able to comply with Idaho Code § 45-1512 
had it chosen to do so. And, in the event 
the VA had directed the lenders involved to 
comply with Section 45-1512, and had the 
lenders refused to follow such direction, 
then the veterans would have been released 
from personal liability and the VA would 
not have been required to pay lenders in-
volved as guarantor of the mortgage notes. 
Accord United States v. Church, 736 
F.Supp. 1494, 1497-99 (N.D.Ind.1990); 
United States v. Davis, 756 F.Supp. 1162, 
1165 (E.D.Wis.1991). 
Put simply, the veterans herein are enti-
tled to no less protection than the veterans 
in Whitehead The VA cannot be permit-
ted to overlook such statutory protections 
and then, long after default and fore-
closure have taken place, rely on its indem-
nity rights to pursue collection activities 
against veterans. Thus, in failing to have 
directed the lenders involved to follow the 
Idaho foreclosure procedures, the VA 
failed to preserve the rights of such lend-
ers, and of the VA, to obtain deficiency 
judgments on the defaulted VA guaranteed 
loans. 
(e) Conclusion on cross-motions for 
summary judgment 
Based on the foregoing discussion and 
the standard for granting summary judg-
ment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, this court is compelled to 
find that the VA's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be denied and that plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment should 
be granted. 
III. ORDER 
Based on the foregoing and the court 
being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
the United States of America and the Vet-
erans Administration as named parties 
should be, and is hereby, GRANTED; ac-
cordingly, the parties shall conform the 
caption of all future pleadings filed herein 
to the caption set forth at the outset of this 
order. 
2. That plaintiffs' cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment should be, and is hereby, 
GRANTED. 
3. That defendant's Motion for Summa-
ry Judgment should be and is hereby, DE-
NIED. 
( o |KtVHUMBtK SYSTEM > 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTA-
TION COMPANY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
MAGA TRUCKING COMPANY; et 
al., Defendants. 
No. CV-N-89-352 BRT. 
United States District Court, 
D. Nevada. 
March 14, 1991. 
* Railroad sued trucking company for 
damages resulting from collision of train 
* with tractor trailer owned by company 
t which had become stranded across railroad 
tracks. Trucking company counterclaimed 
for damages to its tractor trailer allegedly 
caused by railroad's negligent maintenance 
of crossing. Railroad moved for summary 
judgment on counterclaim on ground that 
federal law preempted field of railroad 
safety. The District Court, Bruce R. 
Thompson, J., held* that federal laws and 
regulations on railroad safety did not 
preempt all causes of action against rail-
road predicated on state law concepts of 
negligence, but was limited to voiding state 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSP. 
Cite a* 758 F.Supp. 
statutes and local ordinances governing rail 
safety requirements in specific areas gov-
erned by federal regulation. 
Motion denied. 
Railroads <s=>21, 223 
States e=>18.21 
Federal laws and regulations did not 
preempt field of railroad safety so as to 
obliterate all causes of action against rail-
road predicated on state law concepts of 
negligence; preemption was limited to void-
ing state statutes and local ordinances gov-
erning rail safety requirements in specific 
areas governed by federal regulation. 
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 
§§ 101 et seq., 205; 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 421 et 
seq., 434; 23 U.S.C.A. § 130(d); NRS 704.-
303. 
Alfred Osborne, Reno, Nev., for plaintiff. 
Charles W. Spann, Reno, Nev., for defen-
dants. 
ORDER DENYING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
BRUCE R. THOMPSON, District 
Judge. 
This action was brought by Southern Pa-
cific Transportation Company (S.P.) against 
Maga Trucking Company (Maga) for dam-
ages to its equipment, tracks, and freight 
resulting from a collision on June 12, 1989 
of its train with a tractor and trailer owned 
by Maga which had become stranded 
across the railroad tracks at the Herschell 
Road crossing approximately 8.5 miles 
west of Winnemucca, Nevada. S.P. alleged 
negligence of the Maga driver. Maga 
counterclaimed for damages to its tractor-
trailer allegedly caused by S.P.'s negligent 
maintenance of the crossing. S.P. has 
moved for summary judgment upon the 
ground that federal law has preempted the 
field of the standard of care respecting 
railroad safety and that there can be no 
cause of action predicated on state law 
concepts of negligence. During the dis-
covery period the evidence on this issue has 
been fully developed. 
CO. v. MAGA TRUCKING CO. 609 
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The federal statutes and regulations im-
plicated by the motions are the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) (45 U.S.C. 
§ 421 et seq.) and the Federal Aid High-
way Act (23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). 
45 U.S.C. § 434 provides: 
The Congress declares that laws, rules, 
regulations, orders, and standards relat-
ing to railroad safety shall be nationally 
uniform to the extent practicable. A 
State may adopt or continue in force any 
law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety until such time 
as the Secretary has adopted a rule, reg-
ulation, order, or standard covering the 
subject matter of such State require-
ment. A State may adopt or continue in 
force an additional or more stringent 
law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety when neces-
sary to eliminate or reduce an essentially 
local safety hazard, and when not incom-
patible with any Federal law, rule, regu-
lation, order, or standard, and when not 
creating an undue burden on interstate 
commerce. 
23 U.S.C. § 130(d) provides: 
Survey and schedule of projects.— 
Each State shall conduct and system-
atically maintain a survey of all high-
ways to identify those railroad crossings 
which may require separation, relocation, 
or protective devices, and establish and 
implement a schedule of projects for this 
purpose. At a minimum, such a schedule 
'shall provide signs for all railway-high-
way 'crossings. 
The Department of Transporta,tion (DOT) 
has prescribed some safety regulations per-
taining to the installation and maintenance 
of railroad tracks and the roadbed (49 
C.F.R. § 213.1 et seq.), none of which are 
applicable to the alleged facts of this case. 
Nevada has a statute which implements 
the requirements of 23 U.S.C. § 130(b), su-
pra. This statute, NRS § 704.300, pro-
vides: 
1. After an investigation and hearing, 
which has been initiated either upon the 
commissions own motion, or as the result 
of the filing of a formal application or 
610 758 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
complaint by the Department of Trans-
portation, the Board of County Commis-
sioners of any county, the Town Board or 
Council of any town or municipality, or 
any railroad company, the commission 
may determine, an order for the safety 
of the travelling public: 
a. The elimination, alteration, addi-
tion or change or a highway crossing 
or crossings over any railroad at 
grade, or above or below grade, includ-
ing its approaches and surface. 
b. Changes in the method of crossing 
at grade, or above or below grade. 
c. The closing of a crossing and the 
substitution of another therefor. 
d. The removal of obstructions to the 
public view in approaching any cross-
ing. 
e. Such other details of use, construc-
tion and operation as may be necessary 
to make grade crossing elimination, 
changes and betterment for the protec-
tion of the public and the prevention of 
accidents effective. 
Pursuant to these legislative authoriza-
tions the State of Nevada DOT on Febru-
ary 2-4, 1987 conducted a diagnostic rail-
road safety review of nine crossings. 
Among the participants were representa-
tives of the DOT, the S.P., the Union Pacif-
ic Railroad, Humboldt County, Lander 
County, Washoe County, the Federal High-
way Administration, and the Nevada Public 
Service Commission. The report and find-
ings, dated June 17, 1987, respecting the 
Herschell Road crossing are as follows: 
740-796R, M.P. 408.87 SPTCo. Hersc-
hell RcL in Humboldt County: This 
crossing is located on the S.P. mainline 
about eight and a half miles west of 
Winnemucca. The road ties into Grass 
Valley Rd. and serves several local 
ranches, homes, and mining interests in 
the area. Traffic is between 50 and 100 
ADT with 20 thru trains including high 
speed Amtrak passenger trains. Maxi-
mum allowable train speed is 70 mph. 
The roadway speed is unposted but prob-
ably averages 45 mph, except at the 
crossing itself which has to be taken at 
15 to 20 mph. The roadway alignment 
makes a 'dog-leg' at the crossing and 
was the cause of a single car rollover on 
Sept. 17, 1986. The terrain is relatively, 
flat except for the grade over the cross-
ing (6' ± embankment). The crossing it-
self consists of timber planks in very 
rough condition, is too narrow (15'), and 
is on an (sic) 5# skew angle. The road-
way approach width is 18'. Sight dis-
tance exceeds minimum requirements of 
840' in advance of the crossing and 904' 
down the track. Existing protection con-
sists of passive signing, crossbuck signs 
(R15-1) and advance warning signs 
(W10-1). The National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended 
all mainline high speed crossings used by 
Amtrak be protected with automatic 
gates. 
The diagnostic review team, therefore, 
recommends the crossing be upgraded 
with flashing lights augmented with au-
tomatic gates. Existing power is located 
near the crossing, approximately 46' 
west of the roadway and 52' south of the 
track. The crossing surface will be up-
graded as follows: relocate the crossing 
30' west to eliminate the dog-leg, flatten 
the approach gradient, widen crossing to 
30' (future roadway width will be 24") 
and install an (sic) 'Omni* prefab crossing 
panels (sic). The track substructure will 
be rehabilitated including construction of 
a drywell, new sub base, lateral perfo-
rated drains, engineering fabric, new bal-
last, crossties, and 136# CWR rail. The 
' realignment of the southerly cattle-
guards, the remainder of the roadway 
R/W is by prescriptive rights according 
to the County Road Superintendent, Jim 
Smith. County 'force account* labor will 
be used to construct the new roadway fill 
(use 6:1 fill slopes), pave an all weather, 
roadmix asphalt surface on the approach 
landing platform, approximately 24' X 
100', install 75' galvanized, highway 
guardrail on both approaches, blade out 
old approach, and install new advance 
warning signs and pavement markings. 
There is a BLM/County borrow pit ap-
proximately two miles south of the cross-
ing 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSP. 
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Traffic control will consist of a stan-
dard two lane closure when necessary. 
The new crossing and roadway will be 
constructed first, then traffic will be 
shifted over; however, the new road will 
not be open to traffic until the automatic 
gates are in operation. Concrete barri-
cades from the NDOT district mainte-
nance yard may be used (if available) to 
keep the crossing closed until the signals 
are operational and the roadway con-
struction is complete 
By June 12,1989 (the date of the collision 
in question) none of the recommendations 
of the report had been followed. The ex-
cuse of the S.P. is that the federal govern-
ment had not supplied the funds to make 
the improvements and that it had no duty 
to act until funds were provided. 
The S.P. has persisted in its contention 
that the federal laws and regulations have 
preempted the field of railroad safety and 
that all state standards, including state 
common law standards of actionable negli-
gence, have been obliterated. To put it 
more bluntly, S.P. asserts that in a field 
occupied by federal regulation we have no 
duty to do anything for the safety of the 
general public, vehicles crossing the tracks, 
the train, the freight, the passengers and 
our employees that the federal directives 
have not required us to do. 
We quote from S.P.'s brief on the issue 
of preemption: 
Virtually all recent federal cases on 
grade crossing improvements hold that 
federal regulations preempt the law of 
the states, so as to preclude damage 
claims against railroads under state law. 
See Sisk v. National R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 647 F.Supp. 861 (D.Kan.1986); 
Nixon v. Burlington Northern Ry., 
(D.Mont.1988) (Civ. 85-384, [1988 WL 
215409] 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477, 
See Exhibit 'A' attached to Reply in Sup-
port of Motion to Strike; Singer v. 
Southern Railway Co., (N.C.Superior 
Ct.1989) (Civ. 88 CVS 3898), See Exhibit 
*B' attached to Reply in Support of Mo-
tion to Strike; Flynn v. Howard, (Dist. 
Ct.N.D.1989) (Civ. 89 CO 21, Order on 
Motion in Limine, See Exhibit 'C at-
CO. v. MAGA TRUCKING CO. 611 
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tached to Reply in Support of Motion to 
Strike); CSX Trans., Inc. v. Public UtiL 
Comm. of Ohio, 88-4185 [901 F.2d 497] 
(S.D.Ohio Apr. 13, 1990); Burlington 
Northern R. Co. v. Montana, 880 F.2d 
1104 (9th Cir.1989); Missouri Pac. R. Co. 
v. Railroad Comm 'n of Texas, 850 F.2d 
264 (5th Cir.1988); National Ass'n of 
Regulatory Utility Commr's v. Cole-
man, 542 F.2d 11 (3rd Cir.1976); and 
Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 
474 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.1973), cert, de-
nied, 414 U.S. 855 [94 S.Ct. 157, 38 
L.Ed.2d 105] (1973). 
Perhaps the first case construing the 
Federal Aid Highway Act in this context is 
Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 188 
Mont 286, 613 P.2d 982 (1980), in which the 
'Montana Supreme Court observed: 
Thus the fact that the Montana Highway 
Department or the town of Troy had not 
officially acted to require the railroad to 
provide traffic control devices other than 
the crossbucks is not in itself sufficient 
to absolve the railroad of its common law 
duty, if it existed, to provide a good and 
safe crossing. 
Similarly, in Karl v. Burlington North-
ern Railroad Company, 880 F.2d 68 (8th 
Cir.1989), the court said: 
Burlington Northern also argues that 
because Iowa statutes specifically set 
forth safety requirements applicable to 
grade crossings, and as Burlington 
Northern was not found to have violated 
these statutes, it should not face liability 
at common law for negligence. It is well 
established, however, that '[compliance 
with a legislative enactment or an admin-
istrative regulation does not prevent a 
finding of negligence where a reasonable 
man would take additional precautions.' 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C 
(1965); accord Schmitt v. Clayton 
County, 284 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Iowa 
1979). While Iowa courts have not yet 
had occasion to apply this rule in the 
context of a railway crossing accident, 
courts nationwide have adopted the Re-
statement standard in circumstances 
similar to those here. See Dueffert, The 
Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort 
612 758 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
Actions, 26 Harv.LJ. on Legis. 175, 180-
88 (1989). The district court did not err 
in submitting the issue of Burlington 
Northern's negligence to the jury. 
Finally, we have the case of Marshall v. 
Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149 
(9th Cir.1983), wherein the-court held: 
[10] The locality in charge of the 
crossing in question has made no deter-
mination under the manual regarding the 
type of warning device to be installed at 
the crossing. Until a federal decision is 
reached through the local agency on the 
adequacy of the warning devices at the 
crossing, the railroad's duty under appli-
cable state law to maintain a 'good and 
safe* crossing, MontCode Ann. 
§ 69-14-602 (1981), is not preempted: 
Evidence concerning the adequacy of the 
warning device at the crossing in ques-
tion was properly admitted. 
See also Edwards v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 567 F.Supp. 1087, 1100-01 (D.C.Col. 
1983). 
From time immemorial the railroads in 
this nation have been required, with re-
spect to the safety of its passengers, em-
ployees, the general public and the proper-
ty of others, to use ordinary and reason-
able care under all the circumstances. 
Plaintiffs broad assertion of federal pre-
emption of all standards of care except 
those explicitly ordered is not supported by 
any of the cases we have studied. Preemp-
tion has been limited to voiding state stat-
utes and local ordinances governing rail, 
safety requirements in specific areas gov-
erned by federal regulation. An excellent 
example is Burlington Northern Railroad 
Co. v. Montana, supra, in which the Ninth 
Circuit held that federal regulation had 
preempted a state law requiring manned 
cabooses on freight trains by adopting 
modern telemetry devices to assure safety 
at the rear of trains. The case does not 
hold that if an injury was proximately 
caused by negligent installation or mainte-
nance of the telemetry devices it would not 
be actionable. 
Also, if some courts are so concerned by 
preempting the state common law of negli-
gence, what forecloses the recognition of 
the federal common law of negligence? 
For example, in Urie v. Thompson, 337 
U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 
(1949), the Supreme Court of the United 
States relied on the federal common law to 
hold that an occupational disease was a 
compensable injury under the federal stat-
utes there involved, - saying: "We do not 
doubt that at 'common law the incurring of 
a disease or harm to health is such a per-
sonal wrong as to warrant a recovery if the 
other elements of recovery for tort are 
present/ " See also Hampton by Hamp-
ton v. Federal Express Corp., 917 F.2d 
1119 (8th Cir.1990). 
It is important to note that this decision 
is not supported or influenced by any 
knowledge of the facts respecting the 
stranding of the Maga vehicle on the rail-
road crossing and the subsequent collision. 
Plaintiffs position is that it makes no dif-
ference what the facts are, federal law 
preempts any cause of action for negli-
gence. With this we disagree. The report 
of the Nevada DOT finds substantial safe-
ty deficiencies in the Herschell crossing. 
Whether any such deficiencies were a prox-
imate cause of the collision has not been 
demonstrated. There is some indication in 
the evidence that S.P. knew of dangerous 
conditions in the Herschell crossing as ear-
ly as 1983. It may be that a relatively 
simple repair such as filling in holes in the 
roadbed and replacing worn or broken 
planking would have been enough for the 
crossing to be safely traversable by the 
Maga equipment. Or, perhaps the strand-
ing of the vehicle was entirely the fault of 
the Maga driver. These are all questions 
for another day. 
In consideration of the premises, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that plain-
tiffs motion for summary judgment dis-
missing defendants' counterclaims is here-
by denied. 
LOVE v. 
Cite as 757 *.Supp. 
to make the determination that a crossing 
is unreasonably dangerous. Furthermore, 
K.S.A. 66-231a states that; 
The provisions of this section shall be 
deemed to provide an additional and al-
ternative method of providing for safety 
at railroad grade crossings and shall be 
regarded as supplemental and additional 
to powers conferred by other state laws. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing provi-
sions of this section, nothing herein shall 
be construed as affecting the civil liabili-
ty of any entity for the maintenance or 
designation of any railroad crossing. 
This section seems to clearly indicate that 
the legislature did not intend to change the, 
railroad's common law duty. Finally, as 
the court has recognized, the standards in 
the MUTCD do not apply until a formal 
decision to install a new or different warn-
ing device is made. 
Therefore, as more fully set forth above, 
the court finds the common law rule, that 
where unusually dangerous conditions ex-
ist at a railroad crossing "additional warn-
ings and precautions by the railroad compa-
ny may be necessary," is unaffected by the 
arguments of the railroad in the present 
case. Sexsmith, 209 Kan. at 108, 495 P.2d 
930. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 7th 
day of February, 1991, that Burlington 
Northern Railroad Company's motion for 
partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 62) is 
denied. 
Marvina Lee LOVE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Mike HAYDEN, Governor of the State 
of Kansas, et a!., Defendants. 
Civ. A. No. 89-2028-0. 
United States District Court, 
D. Kansas. 
Feb. 11, 1991. 
Inmate brought action against Gover-
nor of Kansas, Kansas Department of Cor-
HAYDEN 1209 
1209 (D.Kan. 1991) 
rections, and various state officials, alleg-
ing federal civil rights violations and pen-
dent state law claims. Defendants filed 
motion to dismiss or for summary judg-
ment Inmate filed motion for default 
judgment The District Court, Earl E. 
O'Connor, Chief Judge, held that (1) in-
mate had to effect new service upon state 
officials when inmate amended complaint 
to add claims against officials in their indi-
vidual capacities; (2) service upon Kansas 
Attorney General did not constitute effec-
tive service upon state officials in their 
individual capacities; (3) Eleventh Amend-
ment barred federal civil rights claim 
against Department; and (4) Eleventh 
Amendment barred federal civil rights 
claim against state officials in their official 
capacities. 
Inmate's motion denied; defendants' 
motion granted; pendent claims dismissed 
without prejudice. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <S=>427 
States <s=»79 
District court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion in federal civil rights action over Kan-
sas state officials in their individual capaci-
ties, where inmate was allowed to amend 
complaint against officials in their official 
capacities to add claims against officials in 
their individual capacities, but failed to ef-
fect new service upon them. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 4(d), 28 U.S.C.A.; 42 U.S. 
C.A. § 1983. 
* 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=*427 
States <s=>79 
Service upon Kansas Attorney General 
did not constitute effective service upon 
state officials in their individual capacities. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 5(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>531 
Generally, burden of proving valid ser-
vice is upon party on whose benefit service 
is made. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <3>427 
States <s=>79 
Original civil rights complaint against 
Kansas state officials in their official ca-
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Robert E. HATFIELD, Plaintiff, 
v. 
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, Defendant and Third 
Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
BINGHAM TRANSPORTATION, INC., 
Third Party Defendant 
No. 89-1529-K. 
United States District Court, 
D. Kansas. 
Feb. 7, 1991. 
Driver brought action against railroad 
to recover for injuries caused by truck-
train collision. Railroad moved for summa-
ry judgment on issue whether railroad was 
required to install active warning devices 
at crossing. The District Court, Patrick F. 
Kelly, J., held that date of Kansas Depart-
ment of Transportation's approval of 
project to install signals at the crossing 
was earliest possible date that federal law 
preempted railroad's common-law duty 
with respect to additional warnings and 
precautions if unusually dangerous condi-
tions prevailed at crossing, and, thus, duty 
was not preempted. 
Motion denied. 
1. Railroads <3=>307(3) 
States <3=n8.21 
Duty to install active warning devipes 
at dangerous railroad crossings is "law re-
lating to railroad safety" within meaning 
of statute declaring that laws relating to 
railroad safety shall be nationally uniform. 
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, § 205, 
45 U.S.C.A. § 434. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Railroads <fc=>223 
States <s=>18.21 
State may not continue any law which 
relates to railroad safety after Secretary of 
Transportation has adopted rule covering 
subject matter of state law. Federal Rail-
road Safety Act of 1970, §§ 204, 205, 46 
U.S.C.A. §§ 433, 434. 
3. Railroads <s=>307(3) 
States <s=>18.21 
Date of Kansas Department of Trans-
portation's approval of project to install 
signals at railroad crossing, rather than 
date of Department's placement of cross-
ing on improvement list, was earliest date 
that federal law preempted railroad's com-
mon-law duty with respect to additional 
warnings and precautions if unusually dan-
gerous conditions prevailed at railroad 
crossing, and, thus, common-law duty was 
not preempted at time of collision at cross-
ing. Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 
§§ 204, 205, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 433, 434. 
4. Railroads <s=>307(3) 
States <3=>18.21 
Federal preemption of state law does 
not occur until determination under manual 
on uniform traffic control devices for 
streets and highways regarding type of 
warning device to be installed at railroad 
crossing. Federal Railroad Safety Act of 
1970, §§ 204, 205, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 433, 434. 
5. Railroads <3=>307(3) 
Kansas statutes giving state authority 
to require railroad to install different warn-
ing device if state determines crossing to 
be dangerous did not change railroad's 
common-law duty with respect to additional 
warnings and precautions if unusually dan-
gerous conditions prevail at crossing. 
K.S.A. 8-1552, 8-2003, 8-2005,, 66-231a, 
68-414. 
Timothy J. King, Stinson, Lasswell & 
Wilson, Wichita, Kan., for plaintiff. 
Philip R. Fields, Wichita, Kan., for defen-
dant and third party plaintiff. 
Robert Nugent, Turner & Boisseau, 
Wichita, Kan., for third party defendant 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
PATRICK F. KELLY, District Judge. 
This is a personal injury action brought 
by plaintiff Robert E. Hatfield against de-
KM FIELD v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN R. CO. 1199 
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party plaintiff Burlington contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rath-fendant/ third 
Northern Railroad Company (the railroad) 
for injuries sustained as a result of a 
truck/train collision at the Haverhill Road 
crossing on September 29, 1987. In a 
memorandum and order dated September 
24, 1990, the court addressed counter-mo-
tions for partial summary judgment be-
tween the railroad and third party defen-
dant Bingham Transportation, Inc. 
This matter is now before the court on a 
motion for partial summary judgment filed 
by the railroad against the plaintiff. The 
railroad requests judgment against the 
plaintiff to the extent plaintiffs claim is 
premised on the railroad's failure to install 
active warning devices at the Haverhill 
Road crossing. As more fully set forth 
herein, the court finds that the railroad's 
motion for partial summary judgment 
should be denied. 
Summary judgment is proper where the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrog-
atories, and admissions on file, together 
with affidavits, if any, show there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
that the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Ped.R.Civ.P. 
56(c). An issue of fact is "genuine" if the 
evidence is significantly probative or more 
than merely colorable, such that a jury 
could reasonably return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 
2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed 2d 202 (1986). An is-
sue is "material" if proof thereof might 
affect the outcome of the lawsuit as as* 
sessed from the controlling substantive 
law. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct at 2510. 
In considering a motion for summary 
judgment, this court must examine all evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the op-
posing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospi-
tal, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir.1988). Fur-
ther, the party moving for summary judg-
ment must demonstrate its entitlement be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th 
Cir.1985). 
However, in resisting a motion for sum-
mary judgment, the nonmoving party may 
not rely upon mere allegations, or denials, 
er, the party must come forward with spe-
cific facts showing the presence of a genu-
ine issue of material fact for trial and 
significant probative evidence supporting 
the allegations. Burnette v. Dresser In-
dustries, Inc., 849 F.2d 1277, 1284 (10th 
Cir.1988). Moreover, the moving party 
need not disprove plaintiff's claim, but 
rather, must only establish that the factual 
allegations have no legal significance. 
Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerick Real 
Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 
1987). 
The moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law when the nonmoving 
party fails to make a sufficient showing of 
an essential element of the case to which 
the nonmoving party has the burden of 
proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 
265 (1986). That is, if on any part of the 
prima facie case there is insufficient evi-
dence to require submission of the case to 
a jury, summary judgment is appropriate. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 106 S.Ct 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 
In addition, one of the principal purposes of 
summary judgment is to isolate and dis-
pose of factually unsupported claims or 
defenses, and the rule should be interpret-
ed in a way that allows it to accomplish this 
purpose. Celotex, All U.S. at 323-24, 106 
S.Ct. at 2552-53. 
The following facts offered by the rail-
road in support of its motion are uncontro-
v$rted. 
On September 29,1987, a truck owned by 
* Bingham Transportation and driven by 
plaintiff collided with the railroad's train at 
the Haverhill Road crossing in Butler 
County, Kansas. The plaintiff then 
brought this action against the railroad 
alleging, among other things, that the rail-
road was negligent in "[f]ailing to install 
active warning devices at the subject cross-
ing to warn approaching motorists of train 
traffic on the crossing." (Pretrial Order, 
at p. 5.) 
The railroad contends that a negligence 
claim based on its failure to provide active 
warning devices is preempted by federal 
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law. The railroad further asserts that un-
der federal law the state, not the railroad, 
has the legal duty to determine the necessi-
ty of an improved warning device. 
The State of Kansas receives, and for 
many years has received, federal highway 
funding pursuant to the Federal Highway 
Safety Act (23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). 
The State of Kansas, through the Kansas 
Department of Transportation (KDOT), 
first inventoried the Haverhill Road cross-
ing on May 1, 1972. KDOT did not recom-
mend any improvements to the crossing as 
a result of that survey. 
KDOT conducted an on-site inspection of 
the crossing on July 23, 1981 following a 
request from Butler County officials. 
KDOT did not recommend any improve-
ments to the crossing as a result of that 
inspection. 
In February 1984, KDOT updated its in-
formation regarding the crossing. As a 
result of this updated information, the 
crossing was placed on the improvement 
list for fiscal year 1985. On May 1, 1985, 
KDOT again conducted an on-site inspec-
tion of the crossing. As a result of the 
May 1985 survey, KDOT scheduled the 
crossing for improvements. 
On December 11, 1987, Butler County 
officials sent a letter to KDOT indicating 
that on October 5, 1987, Butler County had 
agreed to participate in the installation of 
signals at the crossing. On December 28, 
1987, KDOT approved a project to install 
signals at the crossing. 
By letter dated December 28/ 1987, 
KDOT supplied the railroad with copies of 
an agreement for the installation of 
straight post signals at the crossing'and 
preliminary plans for installation. XDOT 
also informed the railroad that it would 
notify the railroad "in the near future to 
order the necessary material for this 
project" 
On March 11, 1988, KDOT authorized the 
railroad "to order materials necessary for 
the warning devices." In that same letter, 
however, KDOT cautioned the railroad that 
"the actual installation of the warning de-
vices cannot be undertaken until the agree-
ments are executed by all parties and we 
have authorized you to proceed.*1 
Funds were obligated on March 2, 1988 
and approved by the Federal Highway Ad-
ministration (FHWA) on March 14, 1988. 
On March 21, 1988, KDOT authorized the 
railroad to begin work on the installation of 
signals at the crossing. 
On March 22, 1989, KDOT issued a no-
tice of acceptance of the improvements. 
Ths improvements, which were begun in 
1988 and completed in 1989, were sched-
uled as a result of the on-site inspection on 
May 1, 1985. 
Because KDOT schedules improvements 
well in advance, it normally takes approxi-
mately two years from the time of inspec-
tion until the improvements * are actually 
made at any crossing. Because the Haver-
hill Road crossing was placed on KDOT's 
improvement list in 1984, the Kansas Cor-
poration Commission hacf no invo/vement 
with any proposed improvements at the 
crossing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The issue before the court is a narrow 
one. The railroad asserts that to the ex-
tent the plaintiffs claim is premised on the 
railroad's failure to provide additional or 
active warning devices at the questioned 
railroad-highway crossing, the plaintiffs 
claim has been preempted by the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). See 45 U.S.C. 
§ 421 et seq. 
For clarity, it must be noted that the 
plaintiff has alleged the following four sep-
arate contentions of negligence against the 
railroad: (1) failing to keep the% subject 
crossing free from visual obstruction in. the 
form of trees and shrubbery; (2) failing to 
mstaff active warning devices at the subject 
crossing to warn approaching motorists of 
train traffic on the crossing; (3) failing to 
slow its locomotive when proceeding 
through the subject crossing; and (4) fail-
ing to institute additional safety precau-
tions at the subject crossing, including 
"Egging the crossing/' after the railroad 
received notification, in the form of a peti-
tion from its own employees, of the danger-
ous nature of the crossing. As the railroad 
J v. DURLINGTON NORTHERN R. CO. 
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notes in its reply, only contention No. 2 is 
at issue in the current motion. 
Determination of whether a duty exists 
is a matter of law for the court to decide. 
Wicxna v. Strecker, 242 Kan. 278, 280-82, 
747 P.2d 167 (1987). The railroad's com-
mon law duty in Kansas is relatively clear. 
[W]here unusually dangerous conditions 
prevail at a railroad crossing the unusual 
hazard may make additional warnings 
and precautions by the railroad company 
necessary. The crux of the matter is 
simply whether the railroad has afforded 
users of the crossing sufficient and ade-
quate protection under the reasonably 
careful person rule. 
Sexsmith v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
209 Kan. 99, 108, 495 P.2d 930 (1972). Ac-
cord, Jennings v. Missouri Pacific Rail-
road Co., 211 Kan. 389, 394, 506 P.2d 1125 
(1973) (also noted that the railroad's failure 
to provide a traffic control signal at a 
crossing may be considered as a factor 
which makes the crossing more than ordi-
narily dangerous). 
It is well established that Congress has 
the authority, in exercising its Article I 
powers, to preempt state law, California v. 
ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100, 109 
S.Ct 1661, 1664, 104 L.Ed.2d 86, 94 (1989), 
and that preemption is primarily a question 
of congressional intent, see Schneidewind 
v. ANR Pipeline Co, 485 U S 293, 299, 108 
S.Ct. 1145, 1150, 99 LEd.2d 316 (1988). 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has in-
structed that state law is preempted under 
the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion in three circumstances. English v. 
General Electric Co., — U.S. , , 
110 S.Ct 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65, 74 
(1990). 
First, Congress can explicitly define the 
extent to which it intends to preempt state 
law in enacting the federal law in question. 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 
95-96, 103 S.Ct 2890, 2898-2900, 77 
L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). Second, even in the 
absence of express preemptive language, a 
1. A congressional intent to totally preempt the 
field will only be inferred in areas that have 
"been traditionally occupied by the States," if 
the congressional intent to supersede state laws 
congressional intent to occupy an entire 
field may be inferred from a "scheme of 
federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to 
make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it," or where an Act of Congress 
"touchfes] a field in which the federal inter-
est is so dominant that the federal system 
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of 
state laws on the same subject" Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230, 67 S.Ct 1146, 1152, 91 L.E& 1447 
(1947).1 Third, state law is preempted to 
the extent it actually conflicts with federal 
law. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-
43, 83 S.Ct 1210, 1217-18, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 
(1963) (where it is impossible for a private 
party to comply with both the state and 
federal law); or Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 
(1941) (where state law "stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress"). 
The railroad asserts that Congress clear-
ly expressed a preemptive intent in the 
following provision of the FRSA: 
The Congress declares that laws, 
rules, regulations, orders, and standards 
relating to railroad safety shall be na-
tionally uniform to the extent practica-
ble A State may adopt or continue in 
force any law, rule, regulation, order, or 
standard relating to railroad safety un-
til such time as the Secretary [of Trans-
portation] has adopted a rule, regula-
tioriy order, or standard covering the 
subject matter of such State require-
ment A State may adopt or continue in 
force an additional or more stringent 
law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety when neces-
sary to eliminate or reduce an essentially 
local safety hazard, and when not incom-
patible with any Federal law, rule, regu-
lation, order, or standard, and when not 
creating an undue burden on interstate 
commerce. 
is " 'clear and manifest/ H Jones v. Rath Packing 
Co., 430 US 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 
LEd2d 604 (1977) (quoting Rice. 331 U.S. at 
230, 67 SCt at 1152) 
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45 U.S.C. § 434 (emphasis added). That 
section also states that the Secretary shall 
"prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, 
regulations, orders and standards for all 
areas of railroad safety." 
[1] A preliminary question which must 
be addressed is whether the duty to install 
active warning devices at a dangerous rail-
road crossing is a law "relating to railroad 
safety" so that 45 U.S.C. § 434 applies. 
Since finding solutions to the grade cross-
ing problem was one of the few explicitly 
mentioned aspects of railroad safety in the 
FRSA, there can be little doubt that the 
duty to install active warning devices at 
dangerous railroad crossings is a law "re-
lating to railroad safety" within the mean-
ing of 45 U.S.C. § 434. See 45 U.S.C. 
§ 433: * 
(a) The Secretary shall submit to the 
President for transmittal to the Con-
gress, within one year after October 16, 
1970, a comprehensive study of the prob-
lem of eliminating and protecting rail-
road grade crossings . . . together with 
his recommendations for appropriate ac-
tion including, if relevant, a recommenda-
tion for equitable allocation of the eco-
nomic costs of any program proposed as 
a result of such study. 
(b) In addition the Secretary shall, 
insofar as practicable, under the au-
thority provided by this subchapter and 
pursuant to his authority over high-
way, traffic, and motor vehicle safety, 
and highway construction, undertake a 
coordinated effort toward the objective 
of developing and implementing solu-
tions to the grade crossing problem, . . * * 
(Emphasis added). 
[2] This court has previously noted "in 
Sisk v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 
647 F.Supp. 861, 864 (D.Kan.1986), a con-
gressional intent to preempt state laws is 
evident from the plain language of 45 
U.S.C. § 434. That is, by stating that "[a] 
State may adopt or continue in force any 
law . . . relating to railroad safety until 
such time as the Secretary has adopted a 
rule . . . covering the subject matter of 
such State requirement," it necessarily fol-
lows that a state may not continue in force 
any law which relates to railroad safety 
after the Secretary has adopted a rule cov-
ering the subject matter of the state law. 
Further support for a finding that Con-
gress intended to preempt state law by 
enacting the FRSA can be found in the 
following legislative history which evinces 
a congressional intent to establish a nation-
ally uniform control of railroad safety: 
The committee does not believe that safe-
ty in the Nation's railroads .would be 
advanced sufficiently by subjecting the 
national rail system to a variety of en-
forcement in 50 different judicial and ad-
ministrative systems. 
. . . [T]he railroad industry has very few 
local characteristics. Rather, in terms of 
its operations, it has a truly interstate 
character calling for a uniform body of 
regulations and enforcement It is a na-
tional system To subject a carrier 
to enforcement before a number of dif-
ferent State administrative and judicial 
systems in several areas of operation 
could well result in an undue burden on 
interstate commerce. 
H.R. Report No. 91-1194, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admin.News 4104, 4109-11; and CSX 
Transp. Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of 
Ohio, 701 F.Supp. 608, 612 (S.D.Ohio 1988), 
affd, 901 F.2d 497 (6th Cir.1990). 
As a result of the explicit language in 
§ 434 and the legislative history thereto, 
the court finds that Congress has explicitly 
defined a preemptive intent in the FRSA. 
At a result, the first example of preemption 
set forth herein applies to this case. Eng-
lish, — U.S. at , 110 S.Ct. at 2275, 110 
L.Ed.2d at 74 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. at 95-96, 103 S.Ct. at 
2898-2900 (finding that Congress had ex-
pressed an intent that the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144, preempted state law). See also 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Public Utilities 
Com'n of Ohio, 901 F.2d 497, 502 (6th 
Cir.1990) (finding that the FRSA reveals 
clear preemptive purpose); Burlington 
Northern Railroad Co. v. State of Mont, 
880 F.2d 1104, 1105-06 (9th Cir.1989) (state 
HATFIiSLU v. bURLINGTON NORTHERN R. CO. 
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regulation is preempted to the extent a 
Federal Railroad Administration regulation 
covers the same subject matter); Missouri 
Pacific R. Co. v. Railroad Com'n of Texas, 
833 F.2d 570, 574 (5th Cir.1987) ("the scope 
of preemption under § 434 is informed by 
its introductory langua'ge directing the es-
tablishment of national rail safety stan-
dards 'to the extent practicable1"); Na-
tional Ass'n of Regulatory UtiL Com'rs v. 
Coleman, 542 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir.1976) 
(finding that the FRSA evinces a total 
preemptive intent); Donelon v. New Or-
leans Terminal Co., 474 F.2d 1108, 1112 
(5th Cir.1973) (the FRSA only "authorizes a 
narrow spectrum of deviation from national 
uniformity"). But see Karl v. Burlington c 
Northern R, Co., 880 F.2d 68, 76 (8th Cir.' 
1989). 
*' Although Congress clearly expressed an 
intent to establish nationally uniform con-
trol of railroad safety in the FRSA, this 
court recognized in Sisk, 647 F.Supp. at 
865, that § 434 of that Act specifically au-
thorizes "exceptions" from such uniform-
ity. For example, the plain language of 
§ 434 indicates that preemption does not 
occur until the Secretary of Transportation 
adopts "a rule, regulation, order, or stan-
dard covering the subject matter" of the 
state law. In addition, the state law will 
not be preempted if it is "necessary to 
eliminate or reduce an essentially local 
safety hazard;" is "not incompatible with 
any Federal law, rule, regulation, order, or 
standard;" and does "not creat[e] an undue 
burden on interstate commerce." 45 
U.S.C. § 434. 
2. Since this is the issue the court must address, 
cases such as Sisk v. National R.R. Passenger 
Corp, 647 F.Supp. 861, 864 (D.Kan.1986), are 
somewhat distinguishable. For instance, in Sisk 
the state law in question was a local ordinance 
which set the speed limit for trains passing 
through the city. That ordinance was clearly 
contrary to train speed limits established by the 
Secretary. Thus, unlike the present case, in 
Sisk there was no question that the Secretary 
had issued rules which "covered the same sub-
ject matter" as the state law. 
3. Since § 434 is keyed to action taken by the 
Secretary, the railroad's citations to highway 
laws, 23 U.S.C. § 101 et scq., arc not helpful. 
Although such citations may show the Secretary 
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Since no claim is made in this case that 
the duty to install active warning devices at 
railroad crossings is essentially a local 
safety hazard, the second "exception" for 
preemption discussed above does not apply 
and will not be addressed herein. As a 
result, the only question the court must 
address is whether the Secretary has 
adopted standards "covering the subject 
matter" of the duty to install active warn-
ing devices at railroad crossings where un-
usually dangerous conditions exist2 
The preemption provision in 45 U.S.C. 
§ 434 is keyed to action taken by the Secre-
tary.3 Furthermore, the preemption provi-
sion in the FRSA does not merely relate to 
those regulations promulgated by the Fed-
eral Railroad Administration through pow-
ers delegated by the Secretary of Transpor-
tation; it relates to all rules and regula-
tions regarding railroad safety promul-
gated by the Secretary. CSX Transp., 
Inc., 901 F.2d at 501. See also Burlington 
Northern Railroad Co., 880 F.2d at 1106, 
(the FRSA does not merely preempt state 
laws which are inconsistent with standards 
adopted by the Secretary; it preempts all 
state laws aimed at the same safety con-
cern addressed by standards promulgated 
by the Secretary). 
In asserting that the Secretary has 
adopted relevant standards in this case, the 
railroad points out that 23 C.F.R. 
§ 655.601(a) (1990) incorporates by refer-
ence the Manual on Uniform Traffic Con-
trol Devices for Streets and Highways 
(MUTCD).< Part VIII of the MUTCD is 
titled, "Traffic Control Systems For Rail-
had the power to take the action he did, the 
Secretary's power is not at issue in this suit. 
Only action actually taken by the Secretary is 
relevant to the matter now before the court. 
4. The MUTCD was adopted by the Secretary in 
1983. It is not separately set forth in the Code 
of Federal Regulations but is published by the 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 
Highway Administration. The MUTCD may be 
purchased from the Superintendent of Doc-
uments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402 (Stock No. 050-001-81001-8). 
It is available for inspection and copying as 
prescribed in 49 C.F.R. Part 7, App.D. 23 C.F.R. 
§ 65S.601(a) (1990). 
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road—Highway Grade Crossings." A rele-
vant portion of Part VIII states as follows: 
BA-1 Functions 
With due regard for safety and for the 
integrity of operations by highway and 
railroad users, the highway agency and 
the railroad company are entitled to joint-
ly occupy the right-of-way in the conduct 
of their assigned duties. This requires 
joint responsibility in the traffic control 
function between the public agency and 
the railroad. The determination of need 
and selection of devices at a grade cross-
ing is made by the public agency with 
jurisdictional authority. Subject to such 
determination and selection, the design, 
installation and operation shall be ih ac-
cordance with the national standards con-
tained herein. 
8A-2 Use of Standard Devices 
The grade crossing traffic control de-
vices, systems, and practices described 
herein are intended for use both in new 
installations and at locations where gen-
eral replacement of present apparatus is 
made, consistent with Federal and State 
laws and regulations. 
8D-1 Selection of Systems and Devices 
The selection of traffic control devices 
at a grade crossing is determined by 
public agencies having jurisdictional re-
sponsibility at specific locations . . . 
Due to the large number of significant 
variables which must be considered there 
is no single standard system of active 
traffic control devices universally appli-
cable for grade crossings. Based on all 
engineering and traffic investigation, a 
determination is made whether any ac-
tive traffic control system is required at 
a crossing and, if so, what type is appro-
priate. Before a new or modified grade 
crossing traffic control system is install-
ed, approval is required from the appro-
priate agency within a given State. 
MUTCD, pp. 8A-1 and 8D-1. 
The railroad also points out that the 
MUTCD is adopted as the "national stan-
dard for all traffic control devices installed 
on any street, [or] highway . . . open to 
public travel," 23 C.F.R. § 655.603(a) 
(1990), and is the standard for rail-highway 
grade crossing improvements pursuant to 
23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) (1990). Further-
more, 23 C.F.R. § 655.603(d) states that-
Each State . . . shall have a program as 
required by Highway Safety Program 
Standard Number 13, Traffic Engineer-
ing Services (23 CFR 1204.4) which shall 
include provisions for the systematic up-
grading of substandard traffic control 
devices and for the installation of needed 
devices to achieve conformity with the 
MUTCD. 
Highway Safety Program Guideline No. 13, 
Traffic Engineering Services, U (I)(D)(5), 
23 C.F.R. § 1204.4, states in part that a 
state's program should have "[a]n imple-
mentation schedule to utilize traffic engi-
neering manpower to . . . [a]nalyze poten-
tially hazardous locations, such as sharp 
curves, steep grades, and railroad grade 
crossings and develop appropriate counter-
measures." 
The railroad also points out that 23 
C.F.R. Part 646 A (with respect to federal 
aid highways), and Part 924 (dealing with 
all other public roads) contain regulations 
by the Secretary dealing with the upgrad-
ing of rail-highway crossings. For in-
stance, 23 C.F.R. § 924.1 says its purpose 
"is to set forth policy for the development 
and implementation of a comprehensive 
highway safety improvement program in 
each State." The planning component of 
this program notes that the states are to 
A
 have a process which will establish "priori-
ties for implementing highway safety im-
provement projects." 23 C.F.R 
§ 924.9(a)(4). In addition, to establish such 
priorities the program is to consider, 
among other things, "[t]he relative hazard 
of public railroad-highway grade crossings 
based on a hazard index formula," 23 
C.F.R. § 924.9(a)(4)(iii). 
The railroad argues that the above regu-
lations indicate the Secretary has promul-
gated rules dealing with the duty to install 
active warning devices at railroad cross-
ings. More specifically, the railroad ar-
gues that since the MUTCD states that 
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"[t]he determination of need and selection 
of devices at a grade crossing is made by 
the public agency with jurisdictional au-
thority," the state—not the railroad—has 
the duty to install active warning devices at 
dangerous railroad crossings. 
There are a few cases which have direct-
ly addressed the issue of the FRSA's 
preemptive effect on a railroad's common 
law duty to use reasonable care when pass-
ing through highway crossings. Those 
cases sharply differ, however, on the appli-
cability and extent of preemption by the 
FRSA on such a claim. 
The pertinent cases can be divided into 
the following three categories: (1) strict 
preemption, Armijo v. The Atchinson, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, Co., 7£>4 
F.Supp. 1526 (D.N.Mex.1990); (2) no pre-
emption, Karl v. Burlington Northern R. 
Co., 880 F.2d 68 (8th Cir.1989); and (3) 
contingent preemption, Marshall v. Bur-
lington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 
1154 (9th Cir.1983).5 
The railroad's primary argument in this 
case relies on the strict preemption princi-
ples used by the very recent New Mexico 
case of Armijo.* The New Mexico court 
found that the Secretary acted with regard 
to the installation of warning devices at 
railroad crossings by the promulgation of 
the procedures outlined in 23 C.F.R. 
§ 646 200 et seq. and by the adoption of the 
MUTCD as the national standard. Armijo, 
at 1531. More specifically, the court noted 
that the MUTCD, Part VIII, fl 8A-1, states 
that "the determination of need and selec-
tion of devices at a grade crossing is made 
by the public agency with jurisdictional au-
thority." Armijo, at 1531. As a result, 
the court concluded that any New Mexico 
state common law or statutory law placing 
a duty on the railroad to determine the 
need and selection of the appropriate warn-
ing devices at a railroad crossing wan 
5. In finding no preemption on the facts before 
the court, Judge Saffeis, in Taylor v. St. Louis 
Southwestern Ry. Co., 746 F^upp. 50, 54-55 
(D.Kan. 1990), relied in part on Karl and in part 
on Marshall, but did not state which rationale 
the court was following In another very recent 
case, Easterwood v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 
742 RSupp. 676 (N.D.Ga.1990), the court basi-
preempted by the FRSA because the Secre-
tary had adopted rules covering that sub-
ject matter within the meaning of § 434. 
Id. at 1530. 
The Armijo opinion is well reasoned and 
sets forth a persuasive argument for adop-
tion of the strict preemption standard. 
However, the result of using that standard 
is terribly inequitable and contrary to the 
recognized view that "§ 434 manifests an 
intent to avoid gaps in safety regulations 
by allowing state regulation until federal 
standards are adopted." Southern Pacific 
Transp. v. Public Utilities Com'n, 647 
RSupp. 1220, 1225 (N.D.Cal.1986), affd 
per curiam, 820 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir.1987). 
For instance, if the strict preemption 
view is adopted, then preemption of the 
railroad's common law duty occurred either 
in 1983, when the MUTCD was first 
adopted by reference by the promulgation 
of 23 C.F.R. § 655.601(a), or in 1975, when 
the Secretary first promulgated 23 C.F.R. 
§ 646.200 et seq. However, the relevant 
state or local authorities would not yet 
have had a duty to replace or upgrade the 
warning device at an unreasonably danger-
ous crossing on either of those effective 
dates. 
Part VIII of the MUTCD, 11 8A-2, specifi-
cally notes that its standards are only "in-
tended for use both in new installations 
and at locations where general replacement 
of present apparatus is made." Thus, by 
its own terms the MUTCD would not apply 
to a crossing until a formal decision was 
made to install either a new or a different 
warning device. In addition, 23 C.F.R. 
§ 646.200 et seq. (specifically §§ 646.216(d), 
646.218, and 646.220) require an agreement 
to be entered into between the railroad and 
the state before federally reimbursable im-
provements at a grade crossing may be 
made. Plus, §§ 646.216(d) and 646.218 re-
quire FHWA approval before federally re-
cally followed the Marshall rationale but con-
cluded preemption applied. 
6. It should be noted that the court in Armijo, 
754 F.Supp at 1531-32, alternatively relics on 
the hcrcinaftcr-to-be-addressed contingent pre-
emption rationale used by the Ninth Circuit in 
Marshall. 
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imbursable improvements may be made at 
the crossing in question. 
Therefore, contrary to the mandate in 
Southern Pacific, there would be a gap in 
the duty to protect against unreasonably 
dangerous crossings between the time the 
referenced regulations were promulgated 
by the Secretary and a formally enforce-
able decision was made by the state as to 
the proper device to be used at a particular 
crossing. Such a rule, instead of promot-
ing railroad safety at crossings, as the 
FRSA was intended to do, would actually 
foster retarded improvement of warning 
devices at such crossings. That is, the 
railroad would have little or no incentive to 
make necessary improvements at crossings 
which were known to be unreasonably tian-
gerous. Moreover, the railroad would like-
ly be much less eager to notify relevant 
state authorities of crossings known to be 
unreasonably dangerous and to enter into 
required agreements with the state for im-
provements of such crossings. Thus, the 
, probability that the decision to upgrade an 
unreasonably dangerous crossing would 
get lost in a bureaucratic shuffle would be 
much greater. 
Furthermore, no regulation promulgated 
by the Secretary has been brought to the 
attention of the court which would prohibit 
a railroad from voluntarily deciding to put 
in place an improved warning device at a 
crossing during the gap period. That is, as 
already indicated, II 8A-2 of the MUTCD 
specifically notes that the standards there-
in set forth are only intended to apply 
when the state actually makes a decision to 
improve a crossing. Moreover, the provi-
sions in 23 C.F.R. § 646.200 et seq. on ly 
apply to a crossing after an agreement is 
entered into between the railroad and the 
state (and in some instances only after 
FHWA approves the state-railroad agree-
ment). As a result, it appears a railroad 
still has the authority to decide to install an 
improved signal device at an unreasonably 
dangerous crossing during the gap period 
Because of the above reasons, the court 
declines to follow the strict preemptive 
view. Next, the court will address the no 
preemption theory used by Karl v. Bur-
lington Northern R. Co., 880 F.2d 68 (8th 
Cir.1989). 
The court in Karl did not address the 
referenced explicit preemption language in 
45 U.S.C. § 434 or the legislative history 
which clearly indicates a congressional in-
tent for nationally uniform standards of 
railroad safety. Moreover, in setting forth 
general preemption standards, the Karl 
court said that, "state laws may be 
preempted if they actually conflict with an 
express or implied federal declaration, or if 
the state law is in a field that is so perva-
sively controlled by federal law that no 
room is left for state rulemaking." Karl, 
880 F.2d at 76. Thus, Karl did not recog-
nize the first example of preemption used 
by the Supreme Court in English, — U.S. 
at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2275,110 L.Ed.2d at 74 
(where Congress explicitly defines the ex-
tent to which it preempts state law, see 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. at 
95-98, 103 S.Ct. at 2898-2901). Since this 
court has already found that type of pre-
emption applies to this case, the reasoning 
used in Karl is not persuasive. 
The only other circuit court to directly 
address the issue of whether the FRSA 
preempts the common law duty of a rail-
road to provide adequate warning at rail 
road crossings is Marshall v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc. There, in finding no pre-
emption on the facts before the court, now-
Justice Kennedy said: 
The [MUTCD] prescribes that the selec-
tion of devices at grade crossings and the 
* approval for federal funds is to be made 
by local agencies with jurisdiction over 
the crossing. Thus, the Secretary has 
delegated federal authority to regulate 
grade crossings to local agencies. 
The locality in charge of the crossing 
in question has made no determination 
under the manual regarding the type 
of warning device to be installed at the 
crossing. Until a federal decision is 
reached through the local agency on the 
adequacy of the warning devices at the 
crossing, the railroad's duty under ap-
plicable state law to maintain a "good 
and safe** crossing is not preempted. 
HATFIELD v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN R 
Cite as 757 F.Supp. 1198 (D.Kan. 1991) 
CO 1207 
720 F.2d at 1154 (emphasis added; citation 
omitted). 
This court refers to the rule used in 
Marshall as contingent preemption be-
cause, as is evident from the above quote, 
it recognizes the preemptive effect of 45 
U.S.C. § 434 but holds the extent of that 
preemption is limited, and, in that case, has 
not yet occurred. More specifically, Jus-
tice Kennedy found that under the regula-
tory scheme of the Secretary, preemption 
of a state-imposed duty on the railroad to 
provide adequate warnings at railroad 
crossings was not preempted until the re-
sponsible state agency made a determina-
tion regarding the type of warning device 
to be installed. This rule makes the most 
sense, given the present regulatory scheme 
and other practical considerations. 
For instance, as has already been noted, 
If 8A-2 of the MUTGD indicates that the 
MUTCD does not apply to a crossing until 
a formal decision is made to install either a 
new or different warning device at the 
crossing. In addition, no regulations have 
been brought to the attention of the court 
which would prohibit a railroad, during the 
"gap" period, from voluntarily implement-
ing improved safety devices at railroad 
crossings known to be unreasonably dan-
gerous. 
Moreover, this rule furthers the FRSA 
policy of promoting railroad crossing safe-
ty. That is, since the railroad is still re-
sponsible for unreasonably dangerous 
crossings during the gap period, the rail-
road itself is encouraged to improve the 
warning device in use at such a crossing. 
This rule also strongly encourages the rail-
road to cooperate with state and federal 
authorities to obtain regulatory approval of 
improvements to warning devices in use at 
a crossing. See McMinn v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 716 F.Supp. 125, 127 n. 5 (S.D. 
N.Y.1989) (recognizes part of the railroad's 
duty in guarding against unreasonably dan-
gerous crossings entails seeking regulatory 
approval for the necessary improvements, 
and if the railroad is not vigorous in its 
attempts to gain the proper authorizations, 
then it is inappropriate to absolve the rail-
road of liability). See also Kan.Admin 
Regs. 82-7-4(a) (specifically notes that the 
railroad can request the Kansas Corpora-
tion Commission to inspect any railroad 
crossing and the Commission then has to 
make a designation of whether or not the 
crossing is dangerous). 
[3] However, the railroad argues that 
even if the court follows the Marshall ra-
tionale in this case, the latest date of pre-
emption would be when KDOT placed the 
crossing in question on the improvement 
list in 1985. The railroad reasons that the 
only prerequisite for preemption is for the 
state to give some indication as to the 
"adequacy" of the warning device at a 
particular crossing. It bases this rationale 
on the fact that the court in Marshall said 
that "[u]ntil a federal decision is reached 
through the local agency on the adequacy 
of the warning devices at the crossing, the 
railroads's duty under applicable state law 
to maintain a 'good and safe' crossing . . . 
is not preempted." 720 F.2d at 1154 (cita-
tion omitted). This argument is flawed for 
several reasons. 
For instance, such argument ignores the 
"gap" period problems and ignores the fact 
that the MUTCD, at II 8A-2, seems to indi-
cate that the MUTCD does not apply to a 
crossing until a formal decision is made to 
install either a new or different warning 
device at the crossing. More importantly, 
however, the railroad's reasoning ignores 
the sentence immediately before the relied 
on language. 
[4] That sentence states that the rele-
vant state authority had "made no deter-
mination under the manual regarding the 
type of warning device to be installed at 
the crossing." Marshall, 720 F.2d at 1154 
(emphasis added). This sentence clearly 
seems to modify the court's conclusion in 
the next sentence that no "federal decision 
[had been] reached through the local agen-
cy on the adequacy of the warning devices 
at the crossing." Id. As a result, the 
court finds that the rationale in Marshall 
mandates a finding that preemption does 
not occur until a "determination under the 
[MUTCD] regarding the type of warning 
device to be installed at the crossing" is 
made Id. 
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A good argument can be made that no 
"determination" is made by the relevant 
state agency concerning the "type of warn-
ing device to be installed" until a formal 
enforceable agreement is entered into for 
the installation of such warning device. 
For instance, 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.216(e), 646.-
218, and 646.220 all require a formal agree-
ment to be entered into between the rail-
road and the relevant state agency before 
federal funds are available for the improve-
ment of a railroad crossing warning device. 
In addition, projects seeking federal fund-
ing under either § 646.216 or § 646.218 
require FHWA approval before the state-
railroad agreement is an enforceable agree-
ment Thus, in those cases where FHWA 
approval of the state-railroad agreement is 
required (i.e., § 646.216(e) or § 646.218 ap-
plied), preemption would not occur until 
such approval was forthcoming. In those 
case where FHWA approval is not neces-
sary (i.e., § 646.220 applies), preemption 
would occur as soon as a formal state-rail-
road agreement was entered into. 
It should also be noted that subpara-
graph (d)(l)(ii) of § 646.220 requires compli-
ance with 23 C.F.R. § 140, Subpart I. Sec-
tion 140.916, which is within Subpart I, 
states that 
The cost of essential protective servic-
es which, in the opinion of a railroad 
company, are required to ensure safety 
to railroad operations during certain peri-
ods of the construction of a project, is 
reimbursable provided an item for such 
services is incorporated in the State-rail-
road agreement or in a work order issued 
by the State and approved by FHWA. 
This provision is important for two reasons. 
First, it recognizes that the Secretary in-
tended the railroad to be responsible for 
some aspects of railroad safety even dur-
ing construction (i.e., after a formal agree-
ment was entered into). Second, it recog-
nizes that the entering into of the state-rail-
road agreement is a time for switching of 
duties. 
Thus, since many duties and obligation 
are either incurred or switched by the en-
7. Thus, the later date of when an enforceable 
state-railroad agreement was actually entered 
tering into of an enforceable state-railroad 
agreement, it would be reasonable to as-
sume that preemption also occurs at such 
time. However, given the established facts 
in this case, it is not necessary for the 
court to determine in this case whether 
preemption does not occur until the enter-
ing into of the agreement 
The Marshall rule mandates that pre-
emption does not occur until a "determina-
tion" is made as to the "type of warning 
device to be installed." An established fact 
in this case is that KDOT did not approve 
the project to install signals at the crossing 
in question until December 28,1987. If the 
Marshall rule is applied to such established 
fact, the court must conclude the earliest 
time preemption could have occurred was 
on December 28, 1987.7 Since the accident 
in question occurred on September 29, 
1987, the court finds that preemption of the 
railroad's common law'duty to provide an 
active or additional warning device at a 
crossing believed to be unreasonably dan-
gerous had not yet occurred. 
[5] An alternative argument made by 
the railroad is that Kansas has, by statutes 
and regulations, changed the common law 
duty of the railroad. For instance, the 
railroad notes that Kansas has said by stat-
ute that the Kansas Secretary of Transpor-
tation, the State Corporation Commission, 
or in some instances local authorities, may 
designate railroad crossings which are dan-
gerous and need installation of different 
safety devices. K.S.A. §§ 8-1552, 8-2005, 
66-231a, and 68-414. Plus, the MUTCD 
has been specifically adopted in Kansas 
and is to be used by the authorities in 
making upgrade determinations. K.S.A. 
§§ 8-2003, 66-231a, and Kan.Admin.Regs. 
82-7-4(c) (1989). This argument is not per-
suasive. 
The cited sections merely recognize that 
the state has the authority to require the 
railroad to install a different warning de-
vice if the state determines the crossing to 
be dangerous. No stkte law is brought to 
the attention of the court which requires 
state authorities, and only state authorities, 
into is irrelevant given the established facts in 
this case. 
LOVE v. 
Cite as 757 F.Supp, 
to make the determination that a crossing 
is unreasonably dangerous. Furthermore, 
K.S.A. 66-231a states that: 
The provisions of this section shall be 
deemed to provide an additional and al-
ternative method of providing for safety 
at railroad grade crossings and shall be 
regarded as supplemental and additional 
to powers conferred by other state laws. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing provi-
sions of this section, nothing herein shall 
be construed as affecting the civil liabili-
ty of any entity for the maintenance or 
designation of any railroad crossing. 
This section seems to clearly indicate that 
the legislature did not intend to change the 
railroad's common law duty. Finally, as 
the court has recognized, the standards in 
the MUTCD do not apply until a formal 
decision to install a new or different warn-
ing device is made. 
Therefore, as more fully set forth above, 
the court finds the common law rule, that 
where unusually dangerous conditions ex-
ist at a railroad crossing "additional warn-
ings and precautions by the railroad compa-
ny may be necessary," is unaffected by the 
arguments of the railroad in the present 
case. Sexsmith, 209 Kan. at 108, 495 P.2d 
930. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 7th 
day of February, 1991, that Burlington 
Northern Railroad Company's motion for 
partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 62) is 
denied. 
_/w\ 
(O I KEYNUM8«TYSTCJy 
Marvina Lee LOVE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Mike HAYDEN, Governor of the State 
of Kansas, et a!., Defendants. 
Civ. A. No. 89-2028-0. 
United States District Court, 
D. Kansas. 
Feb. 11, 1991. 
Inmate brought action against Gover-
nor of Kansas, Kansas Department of Cor-
HAYDEN 1209 
1209 (D.Kan. 1991) 
rections, and various state officials, alleg-
ing federal civil rights violations and pen-
dent state law claims. Defendants filed 
motion to dismiss or for summary judg-
ment Inmate filed motion for default 
judgment The District Court, Earl E. 
O'Connor, Chief Judge, held that (1) in-
mate had to effect new service upon state 
officials when inmate amended complaint 
to add claims against officials in their indi-
vidual capacities; (2) service upon Kansas 
Attorney General did not constitute effec-
tive service upon state officials in their 
individual capacities; (3) Eleventh Amend-
ment barred federal civil rights claim 
against Department; and (4) Eleventh 
Amendment barred federal civil rights 
claim against state officials in their official 
capacities. 
Inmate's motion denied; defendants' 
motion granted; pendent claims dismissed 
without prejudice. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <e=*427 
States <s=»79 
District court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion in federal civil rights action over Kan-
sas state officials in their individual capaci-
ties, where inmate was allowed to amend 
complaint against officials in their official 
capacities to add claims against officials in 
their individual capacities, but failed to ef-
fect new service upon them. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 4(d), 28 U.S.C.A.; 42 U.S. 
C.A. ^ 1983. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure c=*427 
States <3=»79 
Service upon Kansas Attorney General 
did not constitute effective service upon 
state officials in their individual capacities. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 5(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»531 
Generally, burden of proving valid ser-
vice is upon party on whose benefit service 
is made. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure e=>427 
States e=>79 
Original civil rights complaint against 
Kansas state officials in their official ca-
